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The Logic of Secession
Self-determination is the legitimating myth for modern nation-
states.1 Despite its radical implications for restructuring international
political authority, the doctrine of self-determination has functioned
primarily to facilitate the breakup of colonial empires2 and to validate
the norm of popular consent in the disposition of territory.3 As the
era of decolonization draws to a close, leaving in its wake an in-
creasingly pluralistic and interdependent world, the right of self-
determination is certain to be invoked in a variety of new situations.
Among the most problematic demands for self-determination will
be those for secession. Claims for separation from an existing nation
fundamentally challenge the long-established principle of territorial
integrity4 and highlight the failure of the state system to provide
mechanisms for the orderly emergence of new communities. Yet, be-
cause the individual's right to choose the community he regards as
optimal for his development is a fundamental social value,5 the demands
1. See pp. 804-07 infra; U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2 (principle of equal rights and self-
determination); id. art. 55 (same); Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 66, U.N.
Doc. A/4684 (1960) (right of peoples to self-determination) [hereinafter cited as Res.
1514(XV)]; R. EMERSON, FROM EMPIRE TO NATION (1960).
2. See p. 804 infra; Res. 1514(XV), suPra note I (unanimous General Assembly
resolution, annually reaffirmed, proclaiming necessity of bringing unconditional end to
colonialism); A. SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION 58-94
(1973) (discussing evolving General Assembly competence to determine whether territory
is non-self-governing and whether claim to exercise self-determination exists, including
recommendations on Algeria, French Somaliland, Gibraltar, Rhodesia).
3. See Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, [1975] I.C.J. 12 (holding application of
principle of self-determination and Res. 1514(XV), supra note I, to Western Sahara
peoples paramount over evidence of past legal and historical ties to Morocco and
Mauritania); I S. WAMBAUGH, PLEBISCITES SINCE THE WORLD WAR 3-45 (1933) (attempts
to observe principle of self-determination among border populations after -World War I).
4. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain ... from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state .. .);
Island of Palmas Case (United States v. Netherlands), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829, 839
(1928) ("Territorial sovereignty ... involves the exclusive right to display the activities of
a State.")
5. See J. MILL, Considerations on Representative Government, in 19 COLLECTED WORKS
OF JOHN STUART MILL 547 (J. Robson ed. 1977) ("one hardly knows what any division of
the human race should be free to do if not to determine with which of the various
collective bodies of human beings they choose to associate themselves"); cf. McDougal,
Lasswell, & Chen, Nationality and Human Rights: The Protection of the Individual in
External Arenas, 83 YALE L.J. 900, 903 (1974) (utmost voluntarism in individual's affilia-
tion, participation, and movement is long-term goal).
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of peoples0 for recognition, freedom of association, and equal partici-
pation in the international order must be directly confronted.
This Note suggests that when the associational right of a group 7 to
determine its political existence conflicts with an existing state's right
of noninterference, the right of secession is paramount so long as that
exercise of self-determination does not abridge the rights of other
groups to self-determination.8 The right of secession thus allows for
an adjustment of the institutions of civil government to evolving con-
cepts of group identity-an adjustment that grants primary importance
to the value of self-definition. The Note outlines factors useful in
identifying and resolving secessionist claims, and demonstrates their
use in assessing Somali demands for self-determination in the Ogaden.
I. From Self-Determination to Secession
All questions of statehood are grounded in the tension between two
conflicting principles of nationality: territorial integrity and self-de-
termination.9 Territorial integrity is a functional means of defining
existing nations; it ensures order, stability, and finality in relations
between states. 10 Self-determination responds to social change and to
6. A people is an alignment of individuals from different social classes and occupa-
tions, united by intensive social and economic communication. The interaction between
a people's subjective, cultural symbols and objective economic factors of communication,
and the interplay between a people and its environment, enable one to identify roughly
both the physical and psychological extent of community ties. The degree to which
a people strives to acquire power for itself influences the formality of its political
and social organizations as well. See K. DEUTSCH, NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL COMMUNICA-
TION 70-80 (1953); C. GEERTZ, After the Revolution: The Fate of Nationalism in the New
States, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 249-52 (1973).
7. Like all human rights, self-determination is based in the individual; this particular
right, however, acquires meaning only when asserted as part of a group.
8. Ideally, secessionist claims should encourage both increasing participation in one's
community and increasing equality among groups, thus fostering an environment in which
self-determination can be exercised most meaningfully. At a minimum, no group can deny
the existence of another group. See pp. 818-19 infra.
9. Compare Res. 1514(XV), suPra note 1, para. 2 (all peoples have right to self-
determination) with id. para. 6 (any attempt aimed at disruption of territorial integrity
is incompatible with purposes of U.N. Charter). Both principles are fundamental United
Nations norms. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2 (principle of self-determination of peo-
ples); id. art. 2, paras. 4, 7 (principles of territorial integrity and nonintervention).
10. See Temple of Preah Vihear Case, [1962] I.CJ. 6, 34 ("In general, when two
countries establish a frontier between them, one of the primary objects is to achieve
stability and finality."). Although territorial integrity and noninterference are the linch-
pins of the present state system, they are not absolutes. See, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction
Case, [1974] I.C.J. 3, 22-28 (state's unilateral competence over its territory and right to
noninterference may be moderated due to positions and concerns of other states); Asylum
Case, [1950] I.C.J. 265, 274-75 (diplomatic asylum entails derogation from territorial
sovereignty of host state).
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developments in people's identification systems; it is a fundamental
ethic of the twentieth century, affirming the right of people to choose
and control their own destiny.1 Resolution of a secessionist claim
involves a choice between these competing norms.
A. Self-Determination as a Fundamental Right
Self-determination has appeared in two historical guises in this cen-
tury. After World War I, self-determination was in theory granted to
nationalities that had previously lacked political form. The victorious
Allies, however, usually did no more than ratify accomplished facts
arising out of the situation of disorder in the defeated countries.12 The
principle was restricted in two regards: it applied only to the van-
quished powers,13 and only historically recognized ethnic groups were
considered natural political entities.' 4 Self-determination was a political
principle, not a legal right.15
After World War II, self-determination emerged as a fundamental
principle in the United Nations Charter' and provided the basis for
the decolonization of Africa and Asia. Yet, the inherited political
boundaries of the emerging nations continued to constrain the scope
of self-determination' 7
The contradiction between the two phases is notable. The Wilsonian
era assumed that the characteristics of the population involved were
11. See note I supra; G.A. Res. 1541, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 29, U.N. Doc.
A/4684 (1960) (implementing Res. 1514(XV), supra note 1) [hereinafter cited as Res.
1541(XV)]; Suzuki, Self-Determination and World Public Order: Community Response to
Territorial Separation, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 779, 785-89 (1976) (self-determination involves
making and breaking of states as community demands change).
12. See A. COBBAN, NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION 22-23 (1945) (emergence of Czecho-
slovakia and Yugoslavia represented political realities, not actual wishes of peoples).
13. See id. at 19, 22.
14. See id. at 21 (fundamental weakness in Wilson's conception of self-determination
was "failure to realize how indeterminate a criterion nationality might be"); cf. W.
OFUATEY-KoDJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 30-31
(1977) (national determinism theory postulates "one nation: one state," with each state
ethnically homogeneous).
15. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J., Spec. Supp..3, at 5 (1920) (resolution of Aaland
Islands dispute between Finland and Sweden held right of free self-determination not
"rule of international law and the League of Nations has not entered it in its covenant").
16. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2; art. 55.
17. See Resolution on Border Disputes, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Res. 16(I) (1964), reprinted
in I. BROWNLIE, BAsIC DOCUMENTS ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS 360 (1971) (accepting borders as
they existed on date of independence); R. EMERSON, SELF-DETERMINATION REVISITED IN THE
ERA OF DECOLONIZATION 28 (1964) (identifying three elements in self-determination formula
within decolonization context: all dependent peoples are entitled to freedom; peoples so
entitled are defined in terms of existing colonial territories, each of which contains one
nation; once such a people has come to independence, no residual right of self-determina-
tion remains within any group, either within or cutting across its frontiers).
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the controlling factor; new nations would be composed of peoples
sharing objectively identifiable traits of language, culture, religion,
and ethnicity. The anticolonialist phase, ironically, accepted the old
colonial boundaries as legitimate and unalterable, regardless of the
incongruous mix of peoples within the political unit. Both concepts
of self-determination are inadequate, however, insofar as they ignore
the basic principle underlying that right: that the freely expressed will
of the people should govern.' 8
While stopping short of the associational logic underlying self-de-
termination, the international legal system has paid some obeisance to
these historical developments and to basic principles of twentieth cen-
tury politics. The system of non-self-governing and trust territories that
was established after World War II had as its goal self-determination
as indicated by the freely expressed will of the peoples. 19 Article 21
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares the will of the
people to be the basis of government.2 0 Further developments in the
decolonization process have catapulted the principle of self-determina-
tion into the status of a generally conceded international right in
that context.21 The 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Indepen-
18. See Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, [1975] I.C.J. 12, 122 (separate opinion
of Dillard, J.) ("It is for the people to determine the destiny of the territory and not the
territory the destiny of the people."). This view reflects President Woodrow Wilson's
World War I statement: "No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize
and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent
of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from
sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property." 54 CONG. REc. 1742 (1917) (Fourteen
Points address to Congress).
Historically, statehood was based on recognition by existing states. This was essentially
a functionalist approach-any effective government was a state. See Tinoco Case (Great
Britain v. Costa Rica), 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 147 (1924). Self-determination, which looks to
popular support for assessing legitimacy, demands certain de jure criteria for statehood.
See Crawford, The Criteria for Statehood in International Law, 48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 93,
149-64 (1976-77). Secession is simply a continuing reassessment of the basis of popular
support that confers legitimacy.
19. See U.N. CHARTER art. 76 (freely expressed wishes of people premise of self-
government); G.A. Res. 742, 8 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 21, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1953)
(delineating factors indicative of attainment of independence, free association, other
freely determined status) [hereinafter cited as Res. 742].
20. G.A. Res. 217, 3(1) U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71, 75 (1948) [hereinafter
cited as Universal Declaration of Human Rights]. The Universal Declaration was adopted
48 to 0 with 8 abstentions, including the Soviet Union. Although not a legally binding
instrument, it is regarded by some jurists as the law of the United Nations, interpreting
and defining the human rights provisions of the Charter and thus carrying legal obliga-
tions for United Nations members. See I. BROWNLIE, BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
106 (1971).
21. There has been an ongoing, and perhaps never-ending, debate as to whether self-
determination is a legal right or a principle. Compare R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAav THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 90-106
(1963) (self-determination is legal right based on U.N. Charter, Res. 1514(XV), and 17
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dence,22 passed unanimously by the United Nations with a low number
of abstentions, precipitated widespread acknowledgment of self-determi-
nation as a right.2 3 The organization of a United Nations committee
to implement the right24 and the acceptance of independence by the
old colonial powers25 indicate that self-determination is more than
just a moral norm.
Within the decolonization context, then, self-determination may
well be regarded as a peremptory right-a general principle by which
a significant number of states feel bound.2 6 A series of General As-
sembly resolutions, proclaiming the legitimacy of the struggle for
independence, elevates the right of self-determination over norms of
nonviolence.27 Furthermore, the recent Advisory Opinion on Western
Sahara held, albeit obliquely, that the present wishes of the in-
habitants are paramount to past legal ties.28
years of evolving United Nations practice, including actions with respect to Algeria,
Angola, and Southern Rhodesia) with Gross, The Right of Self-Determination in Inter-
national Law, in NEw STATES IN THE MODERN WORLD 156 (M. Kilson ed. 1975) (General
Assembly has no law-making competence and principle of self-determination has not been
transformed into right).
22. See Res. 1514(XV), supra note 1.
23. See Emerson, The New Higher Law of Anti-Colonialism, in THE RELEVANCE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 157 (K. Deutsch & S. Hoffmann eds. 1968) (although unanimity be-
hind 1514(XV) is deceptive, in that United States, United Kingdom, France, Belgium, and
Australia were among nine states abstaining from vote, any cause with Soviet Union,
China and vast majority of states behind it represents substantial force).
24. See R. HIGGINS, supra note 21, at 101. Interestingly, the United States voted in
favor of Resolution 1654 (XVI), establishing the Committee of 17, although it had
abstained from Res. 1514(XV). See W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 14, at 229 n.89.
25. See W. OFuATEY-KoDJOE, supra note 14, at 129-47 (much decolonization went on
outside United Nations because of acquiescence of colonial powers, which helped concept
of self-determination ripen into right).
26. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS art. 53, at
698 (1967) (peremptory norm is "norm accepted and recognized by the international com-
munity of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which
can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character").
27. See Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, Dec. 14, 1974, in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 588
(1975) (adoption of definition of aggression that does not prejudice right of self-determina-
tion); Declaration on Printiples of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A.
Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121, 124, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) (authorizing
moral and material support for national liberation movements against colonial powers)
[hereinafter cited as Declaration on Friendly Relations]. Although these resolutions are
not legally obligatory and do not have the cumulative impact of self-determination resolu-
tions, United Nations support for national liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique,
and Guinea-Bissau, the granting of observer status to the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion, and Portugal's inability to muster support against India's invasion of Goa attest to
the growing force behind the belief.
28. Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, [1975] I.C.J. 12, 68 (Court technically found
legal ties, yet regarded them as insufficient to establish ties of territorial sovereignty or to
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Beyond the decolonization context, however, international law has
responded marginally to these beliefs in self-determination and the
consent of the governed. The 1966 International Covenants on Human
Rights, which entered into effect in 1976, recognize self-determina-
tion as a fundamental right underlying the meaningful exercise of all
other rights.29 Additionally, the United Nations in its 1970 Declaration
of Friendly Relations went so far as to concede a right to exercise self-
determination against any nonrepresentative government. 30 But rigid
adherence to the norm of territorial integrity as an ahistorical absolute
has precluded the incorporation of an evolving concept of self-de-
termination in the definition of the international community.
B. The Implications of the Right of Self-Determination
Given the international community's acceptance of the right of self-
determination in the decolonization context, consideration must also
be given to that right's natural outgrowth, secession.31 Although de-
affect application of principle of self-determination); cf. Island of Palmas Case (United
States v. Netherlands), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829 (1928) (traditional title dispute in which
tribunal awarded territory to power first exercising effective control over area, regardless
of subsequent changes in normative law).
29. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49-52, U.N. Doc. A/6316, art. I(1) (1966) ("All
peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.");
International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 16) 52-58, U.N. Doc. A/6316, art. I(1) (1966) (same) [two documents-passed
simultaneously-hereinafter referred to as International Covenants on Human Rights].
The covenants have acquired legal status. 30 U.N. GAOR, Third Committee (2121st
mtg.) 56, U.N. Doc. A/10196 (1975) (Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
enters into effect after Jamaica becomes 35th State to ratify).
30. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 27, at 124 (by prohibiting
dismemberment or impairment of territorial integrity of government conducting itself
"in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,"
resolution gives prima facie support to existing states).
31. Two recent attempts have been made to define a right of secession. One, offered
by Lee Buchheit, see L. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION (1978), seeks to maximize order and
minimize suffering in resolving secessionist claims by developing a utilitarian scheme
"whereby the institution of the existing State will be respected, unless to do so would
contribute to more international disharmony than would result from legitimating the
separation of a component group." Id. at 227. Buchheit's analysis attempts to measure
the value of secession by the yardstick of disruption. Every claim of self-determination,
however, unavoidably involves change and disruption. In striving to impose order on a
situation usually characterized by flux and conflict, Buchheit undercuts the power of self-
determination claims that involve fundamental human rights.
An alternative approach, developed by Eisuke Suzuki, see Suzuki, supra note 11, situates
secessionist demands in a contextual, human-rights framework. He contends that "to
approximate a public order of human dignity ... the total context of such a [self-
determination] claim must be considered: the potential effects of the grant or denial of
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colonization and secession are based on the same political principle-
self-determination-the international community has focused on the
geographic distinction between the two rather than on the common
principle. Yet, the discriminatory treatment of a population living in
a contiguous area is no more justified than the subjugation of a popula-
tion living in a different part of the globe.3 2
At base, self-determination is a concept of group expression and
consensual government. Secession is part of a continually changing
process of self-definition that reflects the varying rates at which polit-
ical and economic institutions and group self-perceptions undergo
transformation. Secessionist demands encounter the same problems of
citizen allegiance, boundary definition, and resource distribution faced
by earlier self-determination claims;33 they only focus the debate be-
tween change and stability at a more explicit, and heretofore unac-
ceptable level.3 4 Just as self-determination challenged traditionally
respected claims based on historic, occupative, or contiguous title,3 s
future secessionist claims will challenge present territorial boundaries
and distributions of authority.
Yet, secession is not a simple act of fragmentation. It is, rather, a
complex, continuing process of regrouping personal allegiances, rede-
fining boundaries and control over resources, and restructuring the
self-determination upon the subgroup, the incumbent group, neighboring regions, and
the world community." Id. at 784. Yet the values and goals by which Suzuki measures
secessionist claims reflect conflicting equity and efficiency concerns, and when choices
between maximizing participation and maximizing production of values must be made,
one has no sense of how to balance, order, or weigh the alternatives.
32. Bangladesh illustrates the fuzzy distinction between decolonization and secession.
See Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law, 66 Am. J. INT'L L. 321, 336 (1972).
33. Cf. A. SUREDA, supra note 2, at 143-51 (emergence of West New Guinea to in-
dependence posed question as to whether Papuans were independent people or Indonesian
citizens, whether old Dutch colony was an independent national unit or an integral part
of Indonesia).
34. For traditional objections to self-determination, see A. COBBAN, supra note 12, at
17-19 (objections of Italians, French, British, and U.S. Secretary of State Lansing to
Wilson's principle on grounds of national security, historic rights, and economic interests
that should have preference). Modern objections to secession are often less subtle. U.N.
Secretary General U Thant expressed the view of most existing governments:
So far as the question of secession of a particular member state is concerned, the
United Nations' attitude is unequivocable. As an international organization, the
United Nations has never accepted and does not accept and I do not believe that it
will ever accept the principle of secession of a part of its Member State.
7 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, March, 1970, at 36.
35. See Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, [1975] I.C.J. 12, 29-30 (historic title is
basis of Morocco's and Mauritania's claims); Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) not-
withstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J. 16, 43 (occupative
and administrative title foundation for South Africa's claim) [hereinafter cited as Namibia
Advisory Opinion].
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participatory mechanisms within and among states. Knowledge that the
option of separation exists can provide a group with the sense of
equality and potential power needed to persevere in an existing
state;30 for those truly oppressed, the right will provide the only means
of effectuating self-determination.
Finally, recognition of a right to secession will alter obligations and
duties among states. A wide range of strategic responses, including
intervention, is available to third parties once they have ascertained
that a legitimate claim exists. 37 Faced with a legitimate secessionist
claim, claims by the existing state to domestic jurisdiction become
invalid, for they are synonymous with assertions of sovereignty over the
territory, which is exactly the issue in dispute.
C. The Conflict of Secession with Other Fundamental Norms
Claims of secession have traditionally been countered by arguments
based on recognized international principles of noninterference, ter-
ritorial integrity, and political independence. Any recognition by the
world community that a secessionist claim affects global peace-and is
therefore potentially subject to international sanctions or support3 5-
is generally met by claims that a secessionist movement is an internal
affair governed by principles of noninterference.39 At the national
level, a people's claim to redefine community boundaries clashes with
the existing state's demand for stability through territorial integrity.40
Descending to the individuals and groups involved, claims for human
rights, freedom of association, and respect for minorities encounter
demands by existing governments for obedience and allegiance in order
to maintain political independence and national security.41 What is
36. See L. BUCHHEIT, supra note 31, at 98-99 (although no explicit provision for seces-
sion in union of Norway and Sweden in 1815, association was regarded as voluntary act
of equal parties and dissolution in 1905 was peacefully accepted after plebiscite).
37. See pp. 814-15 infra (enforcement possibilities).
38. See U.N. CHARTER art. 39 (Security Council determines existence of threat to peace
and measures to be taken).
39. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 (nonintervention in matters within domestic
jurisdiction); compare Nanda, supra note 32, at 335 (U Thant concerned that Pakistani
conflict threatened world peace) with Organization of African Unity (OAU) Resolution
on Situation in Nigeria, AHG/Res. 51(IV), 6 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1243 (1967) ("[r]eiter-
ating their condemnation of secession" and "recognizing that situation was an internal
affair, the solution of which is primarily the responsibility of Nigerians themselves").
40. See note 9 supra.
41. Compare International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights, supra note 29, art.
22(1) (right to freedom of association) with id. art. 22(2) (rights restricted only by legal
sanctions necessary in democratic society for public safety and national security interests)
and id. art. 4(1) (in times of emergency, state may derogate from human rights obligations
in Covenant).
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ultimately at issue is the extent to which a state is regarded as a com-
pulsory or a voluntary association. 42
Close examination of conventional objections, however, reveals weak-
nesses in their underlying logic and empirical assumptions. At the in-
ternational level, a regime of interdependence has characterized the
post-World War II era: military alliances, economic ties, trade rela-
tions, and currency arrangements circumscribe the sovereignty of the
participants. Noninterference has become a nonreality as the growth
in transnational exchanges and global obligations has undercut the
decisiveness of national boundaries. 43 International law has haltingly
paralleled this development toward interdependence by recognizing
areas of shared concern in space, over the seas, and with respect to
people. 44 The submission of disputes to arbitral or judicial decision,
the renunciation of war,45 and the submission of trusteeship territories
to international control46 are specific instances of self-restriction and
acceptance of interference in a state's affairs.47
At the national level, similar technological and economic develop-
ments have vitiated old justifications for territorial integrity and
42. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 20, at 74, art. 15 (right
to change nationality); Harris, Voluntary Association as a Rational Ideal, in VOLUNTARY
AssOCIATION: Nomos XI 50, 54 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1969) (voluntary association
begins as private association; public interest lies in strengthening bonds of voluntary
association, diminishing necessity for recourse to force).
43. See Hanrieder, Dissolving International Politics: Reflections on the Nation-Stale, 72
AM. POLITICAL Sca. REV. 1276, 1278-80 (1978) (citizens raising domestic entitlement demands
can only be satisfied by extensive international interactions; international redistributive
processes increasingly affect national redistributive processes).
44. Although these cooperative schemes often involve regulation of areas and wealth
to which no national society had a legitimate prior claim, the communal resolution of
secessionist claims is not that different conceptually once it is accepted that a government
the population rejects has no legitimate unilateral claim over those people. See, e.g.,
Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil
Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 28) 24, U.N. Doc. A18028 (1970) (exploration and exploitation of seabed area
governed by international regime); Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 9/15 (1961), reprinted in I. BROWNLIE, supra note 20, at 170-78 (attempt to
reduce statelessness by international agreement); Note, Thaw in International Law? Rights
in Antarctica under the Law of Common Spaces, 87 YALE L.J. 804 (1978) (Antarctic Treaty
recognizes no claims to territorial sovereignty over area, but Antarctica should be fully
governed by international law of common spaces).
45. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 (prohibition of use of force in international
relations). That section does not, however, outlaw the use of force for furthering the
purposes of the United Nations.
46. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 75-91 (international trusteeship system).
47. See Chen & Reisman, Who Owns Taiwan: A Search for International Title, 81
YALE L.J. 599, 648-50 (1972) (matters involving interpretation of treaty, territorial con-
flict, threat to peace, self-determination, and nationality of individuals and groups are of
international concern); Loewenstein, Sovereignty and International Co-operation, 48 Ahs.
J. INT'L L. 222, 225 (1954) (partial surrender of state sovereignty has positive quality
in increasing international interaction and agreement).
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rendered smaller entities possible.48 On the one hand, a large and
secure land base can no longer guarantee military security or ensure
economic self-sufficiency; all nations depend on others for defense
purposes and for supplies of scarce economic resources.49 On the other
hand, economic and military groupings need not be congruent with
political boundaries; communities serving different purposes can ex-
hibit different degrees of inclusiveness. A larger fabric of economic and
military interdependencies allows for the existence of smaller groups
within it based on national preferences. 0 Because self-determination
and secession can provide a normative foundation of equality among
states, the tension between the desires to be publicly acknowledged
and to be politically powerful may be resolved by these concentric
circles of political, economic, or military allegiance. 51
Finally, at the individual level, international law has evolved grad-
ually from a state-centered system to one that focuses on the individual.
The Helsinki Accords, the recent proliferation of human rights docu-
ments, 2 and the emergence of self-determination as a peremptory
norm 3 are all products of this development. The recognition that state
actions and obligations derive from people's basic responsibilities and
48. See J. HERz, Tim NATION-STATE AND THE CRISIS OF WORLD PoLiTics 118, 252 (1976)
(since technological development destroys protective function large land base was in-
tended to fulfill, nation-state is now free to perform welfare function for group that regards
state as legitimate); Hanrieder, supra note 43, at 1279 (nationalism can thrive in context
of interdependence and interdependence can survive competing nationalisms).
49. See J. HERZ, supra note 48, at 114-18 (industrialization and development of atomic
weapons have destroyed possibility of national economic self-sufficiency or military in-
vulnerability). Concurrently, the practical unavailability of nuclear weapons for use against
small communities and the discovery of synthetic resources and solar energy may permit
increasing integrity for small states. See id. at 234, 249 (nuclear overkill has paradoxical
result of unavailability; industrial technology may provide liberation from economic
dependency by removing reliance on natural resources).
50. The European Economic Community is an obvious example: a unit can be bound
into NATO's military web and participate in the EEC's economic and monetary structure,
while retaining narrower political and cultural loyalties. See W. REISMAN, PUERTO Rico
AND THE INTERNATIONAL PRocEss 51-108 (1975) (range of international organizations, with
varying memberships, available to satisfy political unit's economic, social, cultural, and
political needs).
51. See C. GEERTz, supra note 6, at 249 (tension in nationalism between what Mazzini
identified as parochial "need to exist and have a name" and what Edward Shils defined
as powerful "will to be modem").
52. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2; art. 55; art. 56 (guarantee of equal rights);
id. at preamble; art. 1, para. 3; art. 55; art. 73 (human rights provisions); accord,
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act (Helsinki Agreement), 14
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1292-1325 (1975); International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1966), reprinted in I. BROWNLIE, supra note 20, at
237; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948,
reprinted in id. at 116; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 20.
53. See pp. 805-06 suPra.
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rights54 has recently led international actors to ignore claims of state
order and self-preservation in Uganda and the Central African Empire
for the sake of human rights 55 Analogously, state demands for self-
maintenance and order should not absolutely bar valid secessionist
movements that would grant new groups the right to self-determina-
tion5" and guarantee individuals the freedom to join with others to
pursue values they deem desirable. 57
II. Analyzing Secessionist Claims
Secessionist demands arise in three paradigmatic contexts. First, one
region of a state may want to secede to form a separate entity. Attempts
at bifurcation have attracted most attention in post-colonial countries,
such as the Congo, Nigeria, and the Sudan, and have been explained
by the excessive arbitrariness of colonial boundaries, which were often
dictated by foreign powers and drawn in total disregard of local cir-
cumstances.5s Second, a region from one existing state may wish to
annex itself to a neighboring state. The Somalis in the Ogaden cur-
rently seek such a restructuring of territorial lines.59 Third, there may
be efforts to amalgamate contiguous areas contained within the bound-
aries of adjacent states. The Baluch, who inhabit neighboring patches
of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran,60 and the Kurds, who occupy por-
54. See C. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 52 (1979).
55. Willingness to contravene the principles of territorial integrity and noninterference
for the sake of human rights has recently occurred in Uganda and the Central African
Empire (now Central African Republic). See N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1979, at Al, col. I
(French and friendly African nations aided in coup deposing Central African Empire
ruler); id., March 6, 1979, at A3, col. 1 (Uganda's Amin calls for counterattack against
Tanzanian invasion, yet many African nations support attack against brutal Amin regime).
56. International reaction to the creation of Bangladesh represents a first step toward
the realization that secessionist claims can protect important human rights and may
require transgressing principles of nonintervention and territorial integrity. See Nanda,
supra note 32, at 336.
57. Cf. International Covenants on Human Rights, supra note 29, arts. 21, 22 (right of
assembly, freedom of association, right to join trade union); Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, supra note 20, arts. 15, 20 (right to change nationality, freedom of associa-
tion). Although the right to choose a nationality has traditionally arisen in the individual
context, a right of secession would in essence grant the freedom to change the nationality
of an entire group instead of just an individual.
58. See S. TOUVAL, THE BOUNDARY POLITICS OF INDEPENDENT AFRICA 3-17 (1972) (although
African borders probably more arbitrary than European ones, problem lies in process of
boundary demarcation itself); Post, Is There a Case for Biafra? 44 INT'L AFF. 26, 28 (1968)
(Nigeria purely creation of convenience for British).
59. See Reisman, The Case of Western Somaliland: An International Legal Perspective,
1 HORN OF AFR. 13 (1978). Similarly, plebiscites were held in the Tyrol and Salzburg
provinces of Austria in 1921 demanding annexation to Germany. See S. WAAMBAUGH, supra
note 3, at 545-46.
60. See Turbulent Fragment, TIME, Jan. 15, 1979, at 32-33.
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tions of Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Syria, and the Soviet Union, 61 are ex-
amples of groups whose secessionist claims would occasion such trans-
national integration. Evaluation of such secessionist claims requires
the development and reasoned application of criteria that are polit-
ically value-neutral.
A. The Uses of Criteria
The merits of a secessionist claim will be weighed by a multitude of
world actors including nation-states, multinational corporations, schol-
ars, international organizations, and economic agencies. 62 Yet it is
extremely difficult to measure the desires of groups advancing seces-
sionist claims in the absence of a social-decision procedure that makes
those choices manifest. Ideally, issues of national allegiance and group
identification would be settled directly through plebiscites. 3 The use
of voting, however, assumes both an international authority willing to
supervise, interpret, and enforce the plebiscite and a state willing to
submit itself to such a procedure. 4 Parties have consistently refused to
accept such conditions when issues of sovereignty were at stake.65
61. See Edmonds, Kurdish Nationalism, 6 J. CoNrEMp. Hisr. 87 (1971).
62. At times a national court may be asked to choose between discrepant executive
policies, which, for example, prohibit political recognition of a group, yet sanction trade
arrangements with it. See Upright v. Mercury Business Machs. Co., 13 A.D.2d 36, 213
N.Y.S.2d 417 (App. Div. 1961) (unrecognized East German government found to have
juridically cognizable de facto existence for purposes of resolving business dispute with
foreign corporation). Economic and financial agencies, such as the World Bank, or multi-
national corporations, can similarly support or suppress secessionist claims by their ac-
tions. See Lemarchand, The Limits of Self-Determination: The Case of the Katanga
Secession, 56 AM. POLITICAL Sci. REv. 404, 415 (1962) (Belgian financial interests may not
have provoked secession, but did provide support that made events feasible); Reisman,
Sanctions and Enforcement, in 3 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 310-18
(C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1971) (United Nations, nation-states, diplomats, businessmen,
financial corporations, clergy, media, scholars, play roles in international affairs).
63. For the most comprehensive study to date, see S. WAMBAUGH, supra note 3, at
485-507 (past problems do not invalidate concept of plebiscites; techniques for conducting
them are improving with experience). While plebiscites, referendums, and commissions of
inquiry comprise the few available tools for directly ascertaining individuals' desires,
plebiscites do not solve the difficult issue of defining who the group is to whom self-
determination should be accorded. The parties involved must first accept the right of
self-determination and agree on the area whose sovereignty is unsettled. See W. OFUATEY-
KODJUE, supra note 14, at 35-38 (critique of plebiscite theory on basis of Sir Jennings's
aphorism that "[t]he people cannot decide until somebody decides who the people are").
Thus, the definitional criteria suggested in this Note, see pp. 816-20 infra, would be
necessary even in an ideal world that accepted the principle of secession, in order to
conceptualize the group and area to be embraced by a plebiscite.
64. The Saar plebiscite of 1955 is one of the few cases in which states negotiated and
consented to a referendum. See H. JOHNSON, SELF-DETERMINATION WITHIN THE COMMUNITY
OF NATIONS 103-04 (1967).
65. The United Nations has succeeded only in supervising and observing plebiscites
that involved terminations of trusteeships, conducted by the administering colonial
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Because secessionist claims often arise in contexts that preclude con-
sensual voting processes, criteria must be developed that yield ap-
proximately the information one would garner from an open vote. In
the absence of central executive, legislative, and judicial organs capable
of compelling desired behavior, the role of third parties in shaping and
modifying a claim assumes importance. 6 The private, ad hoc nature
of most third-parties' decisions regarding secessionist claims eliminates
neither the impact of such choices nor the desirability of arriving at a
choice in accordance with disinterested, articulated criteria.0 7
If enough international actors react favorably to a secessionist claim,
considerable international pressure can be generated. 8 Economic sanc-
authorities. See id. at 82-90, 172-76 (United Nations did not interfere with power of
administering authority to conduct plebiscites in British Togoland, British Cameroons).
Significantly, it has failed in attempts to employ plebiscites to resolve territorial disputes.
See id. at 108-10 (United Nations essentially conceded Indonesian sovereignty over West
Irian by allowing that country to control fully the voting process); id. at 176-77 (India
rejected United Nations proposals to ensure freedom of plebiscite in Kashmir). The
recent Zimbabwe/Rhodesia elections-although in the context of majority/minority rule
and not secession-may mark a new willingness to permit third parties to supervise
elections.
66. Admittedly, there are obvious and important limitations on enforcement in in-
ternational law, including: (1) the absence of centralized executive, legislative, and
judicial organs capable of compelling requisite behavior; (2) unwillingness of states to
submit important national interests to international arbitration; and (3) reluctance of
international officials and judges to assume competence when states fail to consent. E.g.,
Case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943, [1954] I.C.J. 19, 33 (refusal to
adjudicate alleged international responsibility of Albania to Italy, because of Albania's
lack of consent to court jurisdiction). But cf. Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bul-
garia, Hungary and Rumania, [1950] I.C.J. 65, 71 (Court has power to interpret legal
question in treaty between states even without party's consent to proceedings). The
difficulty of forcing a sovereign entity to consent to sanctions and enforcement, and the
Court's (or any institution's) unwillingness to involve itself in areas where it may prove
inefficacious, for fear of undermining its legitimacy, render the internalization of in-
ternational norms highly desirable.
67. British oil companies, for example, were faced with a predicament when the
Biafrans decreed the interception of rents and royalties normally paid to the Nigerian
federal government. The companies' installations were largely in Biafra, thus placing the
companies in the position of endangering their investments if they repudiated the Biafran
cause, or, if they supported the Biafrans, of jeopardizing their oil concessions granted by
the federal government and annoying the pro-federal British government. The com-
panies initially chose to make the payments to Biafra, illustrating the extent to which
the decisions and reactions of outsiders necessarily influence the status of any claim for
change. See Higgins, Internal War and International Law, in 3 THE FUTURE OF THE IN-
TERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 62, at 113.
68. A state might consent to a plebiscite or referendum for purposes of reasserting its
legitimacy, retaining its reputation, and defusing secessionist clamoring. See Namibia
Advisory Opinion, supra note 35, at 65 (separate opinion of Khan, J.) (if South Africa's
overwhelming conviction that Namibian peoples truly wanted incorporation into South
Africa should emerge in plebiscite results, "South Africa would have vindicated itself in
the eyes of the world and in the estimation of the peoples of South West Africa, whose
freely expressed wishes must be supreme"). Of course, the plebiscite must be administered
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tions, as employed in Rhodesia, may cause a state to alter its be-
havior.69 Concurrently, offers of diplomatic asylum70 and a state's will-
ingness to harbor members of the secessionist group within its territory
may aid those advancing a claim7 1
The use of practical criteria for judging secessionist claims may also
serve to improve minority rights by indicating accommodations or struc-
tural rearrangements short of secession.7 2 However, secession has no
less sound a theoretical foundation than less drastic realignments and
should be considered a viable option.
B. Defining and Resolving Secessionist Claims
Third parties must participate in the definition of a secessionist
claim since whatever process brings it to their attention is not neces-
sarily representative. Before a demand for change can be resolved it
therefore must be identified as an appropriate focus for a possible
secessionist outcome. Threshold factors locate such claims: they initiate
the decisionmaking process without constituting significant interven-
tion in the affairs of the existing state.73 Having ascertained the
by a neutral third party, thus circumventing the state's power to phrase the plebiscite
question in a rigid, biased form. Cf. N.Y. Times, March 4, 1979, § 4, at 1, col. 4 (up-
coming Iranian referendum will pose one loaded question: Should Iran return to a
monarchy or have an Islamic republic?).
69. See S.C. Res. 276, 25 U.N. SCOR (1529th mtg.) 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/INF/25 (1970) (ap-
pealing to states not to render financial or other economic aid to illegal regime in
South Africa); S.C. Res. 217, 20 U.N. SCOR (1265th mtg.) 8-9, U.N. Doc. S/INF/20/Rev. I
(1965) (same with respect to Southern Rhodesia). Economic interdependence, see pp. 810-11
sukra, has increased the ability of outsiders to influence secessionist claims without
contravening the U.N. Charter norm in art. 2, para. 4, prohibiting the use of force against
the territorial integrity of a state. Cf. Hanrieder, supra note 43, at 1280 (source of power
in contemporary global politics lies more in economic access and presence than in political
acquisition and rule). Significantly, U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 does not prohibit inter-
vention for purposes consistent with the Charter. If a state were exercising violence against
a secessionist group, intervention for self-determination and humanitarian purposes would
be permissible, as the intervention into Bangladesh illustrated.
70. See Haya de la Torre Case, [1951] I.C.J. 70; Asylum Case, [1950] I.C.J. 265 (Marxist
Haya de ]a Torre sought refuge in Colombian embassy after rebellion in Peru-a situa-
tion similar to that a secessionist claim might present).
71. Cf. G.A. Res. 2787, 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 29) 82-83, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971)
(urging support for Zimbabwe, Namibian, Angolan, Mozambique and Palestinian peoples
in their struggles for self-determination, thereby recognizing groups involved).
72. A range of structural possibilities short of secession is possible, including grants
of regional autonomy; the preservation of cultural institutions such as courts, churches,
and universities; or constitutional guarantees of language rights. See, e.g., L. BUCHHEIT,
supra note 31, at 158 (Iraqi-Kurdish Peace Agreement of March 1970, promised extensive
protection for Kurdish national rights and identity); Post, supra note 58, at 28-29 (1968)
(Nigeria's original constitution contemplated a loose, three-region federal structure).
73. See Reisman & Suzuki, Recognition and Social Change in International Law: .4
Prologue for Decisioninaking, in TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAx DIGNITY 426 (M.
Reisman & B. Weston eds. 1976) (advantages of considering claim include more objective
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existence of a secessionist claim, these factors should be reinvoked at
a more rigorous level of scrutiny to evaluate the merits of the claim.
1. Associational Desire
The decisionmaker must begin by distinguishing claims for associa-
tion, group identification, and separation, from demands for other
internal political and economic rearrangements. Several General As-
sembly resolutions, as well as article 73 of the United Nations Charter,
offer guidelines for that determination. 74 The documents suggest that
separatist claims may stem from cultural, ethnic, or geographic dif-
ferences. They also index the positive factors of self-government-
freedom of choice, freedom to modify one's political status, freedom
from discriminatory social legislation-which, if contravened, would
provide a basis for a secessionist claim. Although the guidelines are
designed for colonial situations, to the extent that any state does not
fulfill the enumerated obligations of ensuring political, educational,
and social advancement, 7- a separate group may be expected to develop
in a noncolonial context as well.7"
Adverse discrimination on the part of the state further suggests that
it regards the group in question as a separate, subject people.77 Because
a sense of disaffection and separateness is insusceptible of measurement,
evidence of adverse discrimination by the government may serve as an
objective proxy.78 Finally, group attempts to bring claims to a regional
or international body provide evidence supporting a secessionist claim.
view of two-sided situation, tending to make future choice based on merits, not political
prejudice; possibility of pressing two parties toward incorporating international norms
into their resolution of conflict); cf. Falk, Janus Tormented: The International Law of
Internal War, in INTERNATIONAL ASPECrS OF CIVIL STRIFE 207 (J. Rosenau ed. 1964) (exist-
ing system's unregulated, subjective characterization of status of parties in conflict leads
to inability to decipher nature of claims at stake).
74. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 73 (non-self-governing territories); Res. 1541(XV), suPra
note 11 (guiding factors in determining whether territory is non-self-governing); Res. 742,
supra note 19 (factors indicative of attainment of independence, free association, other
freely determined statuses).
75. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 73, 76.
76. See K. DEUTSCH, supra note 6, at 52-59 (tendency of separate group to continued
self-expression to compensate for lack of cultural and economic links with ruling group).
77. See Res. 1541(XV), suPra note II (defining prima facie evidence of discriminatory
situations); Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra note 35, at 31, 57 (condemning "distinctions,
exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusively based on grounds of race, colour, descent
or national or ethnic origin"); cf. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 27, at
124 (requiring governments to represent, in compliance with the principles of equal
rights and self-determination, "the whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction as to race, creed or color").
78. In Bangladesh this discriminatory treatment went so far as to fulfill a pattern of
colonial exploitation as defined by Res. 1541(XV), supra note 11, which, according to
some authorities, justified secession. Cf. Choudhury, Bangladesh: Why It Happened, 48
INT'L AFF. 242 (1972).
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Although the United Nations and International Court of Justice do
not accord status to nonstates, 79 many groups have nevertheless under-
taken to air demands in these forums,8 0 and will continue to do so.
Ultimate recognition of a secessionist claim is warranted if the as-
sociational desires are shared by a majority of the group. Existence of
a broad associational desire is essential, for it reflects the underlying
purposes of self-determination-increased personal choice and political
participation. Similar interests and goals should unite the leaders
articulating the claim and the population involved.8' Linguistic, cul-
tural, religious, or ethnic homogeneity, although evidence of group
cohesion, are not dispositive8 2 These factors should serve only to rein-
force a subjective and psychological claim to exist as a unit, not to
contradict a perceived desire for political association. For what is salient
to a people may change over time: religion or shared history may have
traditionally functioned as a bonding force, whereas language or polit-
ical beliefs may account for feelings of identification at a later point.8 3
Limitations exist upon any observer's ability to scrutinize the nature
and range of a demand for association without the benefit of a direct
expression of opinion by the population involved. 4 Outsiders may tend
79. See U.N. CHARTER art. 4 (United Nations membership open only to peace-loving
states); STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 34(1) (only states may be
parties before court).
80. See p. 821 infra. Recognition of nonterritorial actors and protostates has been
slow in coming, however. See G.A. Res. 3210, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 3, U.N.
Doc. A/9631 (1974) (inviting the P.L.O. to participate in the General Assembly plenary
debate on the Palestine question); 76 DEP'T ST. BULL. 335 (1977) (United States position
finally begins to approximate international trend toward recognition of P.L.O.). Ideally,
provisions for extending standing before the United Nations and the International Court
of Justice to peoples and nonterritorial actors should be instituted, thus mitigating the
condition of isolation. Because international relations function according to norms of
reciprocity, however, there may exist a tacit mutual agreement among states not to con-
front such potentially disruptive claims.
81. This concern was a critical issue in Biafra: were the leaders, although claiming to
speak for the territorial unit of Eastern Nigeria, only representing the Ibo peoples?
Compare Panter-Brick, The Right to Self-Determination: Its Application to Nigeria, 44
INT'L AFF. 254, 265 (1968) (yes) with Nayar, Self-Determination Beyond the Colonial Con-
text: Biafra in Retrospect, 10 TEx. INT'L L.J. 321, 326 (1975) (no).
82. ComPare note 14 supra (Wilsonian assumption that nationalities, in form of
ethnic groups, are phenomenological reality) with Suzuki, supra note 11, at 786-87
(recognizing primacy of subjective, psychological criteria over sociological, geographic,
political, or historical criteria).
83. Cf. Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, [1975] I.C.J. 12, 68 (historical ties, based
largely on religious and legal interaction, insufficient to sustain Morocco's and Mauri-
tania's claims over Western Sahara; inhabitants to be consulted about present desires for
association).
84. See p. 813 sutra (plebiscites). Of course, in countries in which public opinion is
relatively unrestricted and communications propaganda-free, an observer can obtain a
fairly accurate picture of public sentiment, and the need to resort to the criteria is cor-
respondingly diminished. These countries are likely to undertake plebiscites as well, as in
the cases of Scotland and Wales.
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to overlook or distrust the formation of nations like Switzerland that
lack traditional indicia such as cultural or linguistic homogeneity.8
Nevertheless, social scientists have identified some institutional con-
texts-such as school systems and displays of official authority-in which
symbolic behavior reflecting clashing group loyalties classically occurs.8s
Observation of such affiliational conflict can aid in measuring the
extent and fervor of a group's desires.
2. Distinct Geographic Territory
A second indicium of a secessionist claim is the presence of an
identifiable land base.8 7 Existence of a geographic base can help dis-
tinguish between territorial groups seeking to defend particular group
values, and political or socially disaffected citizens with no link to the
nation-state system.8 Moreover, the intensive social networks and
exchange of goods and services required by a community presuppose a
physical base.8 9
Although a group advancing a secessionist claim might have an
identifiable land base, a claim would not acquire legitimacy unless the
seceding and remaining states possessed viable territorial foundations.
Viability is not synonymous with undisturbed territorial integrity;
rather, it is an environmental prerequisite for ensuring a group's con-
tinuing right to self-determination. 0
The recent proliferation of "ministates" 91 has underscored the dif-
ficulties that plague small, unstable entities. 92 Nevertheless, global
85. But cf. K. DEUTSCH, supra note 6, at 16, 71 (close study of technological develop-
ments, patterns of trade and communication reveal Swiss state emerging from thirteenth
century onwards).
86. See Geertz, The Integrative Revolution, in OLD SOCIETIES AND NEW STATES 124-27
(C. Geertz ed. 1963) (parapolitics is more virulent form of clashing public identities and
ethnic aspirations that operates alongside usual politics of party and Parliament).
87. See Crawford, supra note 18, at 112 (case of Israel illustrates that people require
territory to become state but precise delimitation of boundaries not necessary).
88. See Reisman, Private Armies in a Global War System: Prologue to Decision, 14 VA.
J. INT'L L. 1, 39 (1976) (critical distinction between bandits or outlaws and private groups
with territorial ambitions).
89. See note 6 supra; K. DEtrSCH, supra note 6, at 15-80.
90. While a territorial base is necessary for a state-like community, the question of
what constitutes minimum viability is difficult to answer. Furthermore, whether a nation
is dependent upon natural wealth and therefore has a right to it depends on one's
temporal and political perspective: Is Zaire presently exploiting Katanga's wealth or
would Katanga impermissibly undermine Zaire's viability by seceding?
91. See E. PLISCHKE, MICROSrATS IN WORLD AFFAIRS preface (1977) (ministates and
microstates are both designations for states with populations less than 300,000).
92. See W. REIsMAN, suPra note 50, at 52 (costs of maintaining United Nations mission,
contribution fees, financial burdens of diplomatic relations and communications can
overwhelm tiny states).
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interdependence has vitiated traditional criteria of sovereign self-
sufficiency and independence and facilitated the survival of very small
units. 3 Thus the possibility of creating a land-locked entity, or of an
emerging nation appropriating a formerly shared natural resource,
should not automatically defeat a self-determination claim.94 Weaken-
ing the surviving states, however, can aggravate future foreign intrusion
into their affairs. Such undermining of the remaining states' future
ability to ensure self-determination must be balanced against the
secessionist claim; resort to the right of secession is precluded if its
consequences contradict the very values being asserted.
3. Violence
Violence on the part of either the state or the secessionist group un-
questionably serves to draw outsiders' attention to a problem area.9 5
Insofar as violence crystallizes lines between opposing groups, it aids
in defining the geographic and psychological bounds of a separatist
claim. Violence by the state often indicates the ruling group's fear of
the self-determination demands and its refusal to permit free choice;96
when exercised by the secessionists it may offer further evidence of the
existence of a group will.9 7
Still, violence plays an ambivalent role in the final evaluation of
secessionist claims. Although violence directed against a portion of the
population by the existing state may support a secessionist claim,9 8 such
violence cannot be regarded as a necessary element of a claim, for that
would allow a state to define who may secede by resorting to, or refrain-
93. See p. 811 supra; 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. IA), U.N. Doc. A/6701/Add.1 at
20 (1967) (Secretary General U Thant's Annual Report) (accepting legitimacy of even
smallest territories attaining independence through self-determination); W. REISMAN,
supra note 50, at 60 (universalism of United Nations admissions policy).
94. Compensation schemes or joint development projects for resource exploitation, and
the creation of land con-idors to seaports should be considered, and may be potent bar-
gaining chips in resolving secessionist claims as well. See note 125 infra.
95. Violence not only attracts attention and concern, but may substantially affect the
future of third parties. See, e.g., M. MOSKOWITZ, THE POLITICS AND DYNAMICS OF HUMAN
RHTS 145 (1968) (massacre of Watusi by Bahutus in Ruanda determined fate of relations
between two tribes in neighboring Burundi).
96. See Ijalaye, Was "Biafra" at Any Time a State in International Law? 65 Am. J.
INT'L L. 551, 553-54 (1971) (grants of recognition to Biafra stressed indiscriminate massacre
of civilians).
97. See Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra note 35, at 69-40 (separate opinion of Am-
moun, J.) (Namibian people, whose existence and unity Court recognized, asserted inter-
national personality through violent struggle for freedom, just as Poles, Czechs, and
French did in World War I).
98. Supporters of Bangladesh's and Biafra's secessions justified their positions by point-
ing to the violence exercised against the secessionists. See notes 32 & 96 supra.
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ing from, force.99 Similarly the use of violence by secessionists should
not automatically justify buttressing the existing order, for it may
indicate a genuine associational desire and help transform an unstable
situation into a more equitable new order.100 Ultimately, decision-
makers must judge the extent to which any restructuring would
promote the longrun achievement of freedom of association and respect
among groups. 1"
III. Application of the Criteria to the Ogaden
The dispute over Western Somaliland, a grazing area between the
Ethiopian highlands and the arid plains of the Somali Republic, in-
volves a confrontation between Ethiopian claims to territorial integrity
and Somali claims for self-determination. Although Ethiopia currently
exercises jurisdiction over the area,'0 2 it is inhabited almost exclusively
by Somali people.oa Since 1897 the area has been the focus of varying
border agreements and attempts at boundary demarcation between
Italy, Britain, France, and Ethiopia. 0 4 The present conflict, rooted in
a dispute over the 1954 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement, has been marked
by continuing outbreaks of war and a deadly minuet between the
superpowers, who have exacerbated the confusion by switching alle-
giances.10 5 This claim by a minority to secede from an existing state
99. This is one of the major problems with Buchheit's method of measuring the merit
of a secessionist claim with respect to present and future disorder. See L. BUCHHEIT, suPra
note 31, at 238-45. Oppression is not always directly correlated with violence. Cf. McDougal
& Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern,
62 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 7-13 (1968) (aggression is not required as constituent element of
"threat to the peace" as defined in U.N. CHARTER irt. 39).
100. See Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra note 35, at 70 (separate opinion of Ammoun,
J.) (struggle of peoples one of primary factors in achieving recognition of self-determina-
tion as international right). Admittedly, violence by secessionists may indicate intolerance
of other peoples, but third parties should be wary of holding seceding groups to higher
standards than those observed by existing states. Ultimately, the proposed criteria could
be invoked on behalf of new oppressed minorities to prevent their right to self-determina-
tion or secession from being transformed into mass expulsion, as may have happened to
the Biharis in Bangladesh. See Zayas, International Law and Mass Population Transfers,
16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 207, 245, 250 (1975).
101. Responsible decisionmaking, perhaps unfortunately, is one of the few means of
tempering an absolute ethic like self-determination. See MAx WEBER, Politics as a Voca-
tion, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 126-27 (H. Geerth & C. Mills eds. 1973).
102. See 161 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1954, at 93-97 (Foreign Off. ed. 1963)
(1954 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty grants "full and exclusive sovereignty of Ethiopia over the
territories").
103. See J. DRYSDALE, THE SOMALI DISPUTE 7-9 (1964) (Somalis have occupied, for at
least last 200 years, 370,000-square-mile triangular area of Horn of Africa).
104. See Latham-Brown, The Ethiopia-Somaliland Frontier Dispute, 5 INT'L & CONIP.
L.Q. 245 (1956).
105. See T. FARER, WAR CLOUDS ON THE HORN OF AFRICA 138-43 (1976) (describing
escalation of American arms to Ethiopia and Soviet balancing strategy with Somalia in
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and join a neighboring state will illustrate the operation of the pro-
posed criteria.
A. Associational Desire
The Somalis in the Ogaden have presented associational demands
by their indisputable opposition to Ethiopian control and continued
desire to be linked to a greater Somalia.100 When the British decision
to abandon the Ogaden to Ethiopia was announced in 1947, rioting
broke out and the Somali clans petitioned the British to convey their
protests to the United Nations General Assembly.10 7 Somali demands
for unification intensified throughout the 1950s and in 1957 the Na-
tional United Front'08 attempted to have the issue of Britain's right to
cede the territory debated before the United Nations and brought
before the International Court of Justice.109
The Somalis are an unusual phenomenon in Africa, knit together
by linguistic, cultural, religious, historic, racial, and even economic
ties. 110 In contrast, relations between the Ogaden Somalis and the
Ethiopian state evince a pattern of oppression and discrimination. In
conformity with its policy of assimilation as a tool for political con-
trol, the Ethiopian government has premised Somali social advance-
ment on their acceptance of the Amharic (Ethiopian) language; official
policy has repressed political activity as well as Somali nationalist senti-
1976). Since 1976, the United States and Soviet Union have switched sides, with the
Ethiopian government breaking military ties with the United States in April 1977, the
Soviets appearing to opt for the Ethiopians in the summer of 1977, the Somalis renouncing
the 1974 Friendship Treaty with the Soviets in November 1977 and the United States
resuming aid to Somalia in December 1977. See N.Y. Times, April 24, 1977, at Al, col. 1
(United States facilities ordered dosed by Ethiopian Regime); id., May 7, 1977, at A3, col.
2 (Ethiopia and Soviets sign cooperation agreements); id., Nov. 19, 1977, at Al, col. 1
(Somalia expels Soviet advisers).
106. See I. LEwis, THE MODERN HIsToRY OF SOMALILAND 107 (1965) (Somali opposition
to Ethiopian jurisdiction surfaced early in 1930s).
107. See id. at 130 (news of forthcoming Ethiopian control provoked rioting and
petition by all clans of Ogaden and Reserved Areas to British authorities to protest sur-
render of country).
108. The National United Front, formed in 1955 for the purpose of regaining the
Haud, was a broad-based association embracing many Somali political parties and or-
ganizations. See S. TOUVAL, SOMALI NATIONALISm 104 (1963).
109. See J. DRYSDALE, supra note 103, at 78-79, 86 (maintaining that "the British Gov-
ernment should have had the courage to take the dispute over nationality to the Inter-
national Court of Justice, where the validity or otherwise of [1954 Agreement] and previous
agreements with Ethiopia could have been settled by the Court concurrently and in-
directly."); I. LEwis, supra note 106, at 151-52 (British refusal to sponsor Somali appeal to
United Nations to refer dispute to International Court of Justice).
110. See I. LEwis, suPra note 106, at I (Somalis one of largest single ethnic blocks in
Africa living in continuous occupation of territory); S. TOUVAL, supra note 108, at 20-26
(1963) (Somalis culturally and linguistically coherent, and distinct from neighboring
tribes).
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ment and cultural expression."' Although a few schools and medical
facilities have been introduced in the Haud and Ogaden areas, equal
treatment has been systematically denied. 112
The strong ties between the political groups demanding Somali
unification and all segments of the Somali population are decisive evi-
dence of a majority desire for secession. 113 The majority's identifica-
tions and aspirations have been clear from the original Somali National
League/Somali Youth League Conference in 1940,"1 through the uni-
versal outrage in reaction to the 1954 Anglo-Ethiopian border agree-
ment, 1 3 to the present willingness to hold a plebiscite. 116 The objec-
tive indicia of Somali cohesion simply reinforce this subjective desire
for unity.
B. Territorial Base and Viability
The Ogaden is a coherent geographic area peopled almost exclu-
sively by Somalis." 7 The interdependence between the Somali social-
economic structure and the environment,"" as well as the clear dif-
ference between the Ogaden plains and the Ethiopian highlands, makes
the area relatively simple to demarcate." 9
Furthermore, resolution of the Ogaden secession claim is devoid of
111. See J. DRYSDALE, supra note 103, at 70-71 (Somali Youth League, institutional
expression of Somali nationalism, prohibited since Ethiopia began administering Ogaden
in 1948); T. FARER, supra note 105, at 83 (treatment of Muslims by Ethiopian officials and
police reflected Emperor's distaste of cultural pluralism and his use of assimilation to
preserve integrity of Ethiopian state); I. LExws, supra note 106, at 182 (advancement pred-
icated on knowledge of Amharic).
112. See I. LEwis, supra note 106, at 182; Reisman, supra note 59, at 20.
113. See notes 107 & 108 supra.
114. See SERVICES D'INFORMATION DU GOUVERNEMENT SOMALI, LA PENINSULE DE SOMALIE
136 (1962) (1940 Conference of organizations with delegates from all Somali regions found
85% of population desiring single Somali nation to be administered initially by Four
Powers in U.N. Trusteeship Council).
115. See J. DRYSDALE, supra note 103, at 75 ("All political parties in the Protectorate
combined in a National United Front and sent a delegation . . . to Britain, and sub-
sequently to the U.N., to protest.")
116. See SERVICES D'INFORMATION Du GOUVERNEMENT SOMALI, supra note 114, at 10 (seek-
ing revision of frontiers based on principle of self-determination); cf. S. TOUVAL, supra
note 58, at 61-98, 212-45 (Somalia has unremittingly pressed claim for boundary revision
at African Conferences and before United Nations, suggesting belief that its commitment
to unity would be vindicated in plebiscite). But cf. Spencer, A Reassessment of the
Ethiopian-Somali Conflict, I HORN OF AFR. 23, 27 (1978) (evidence of numerous Galla
and Negroid groups living in Somalia should logically force Somalia to compromise her
demand for plebiscite).
117. See note 103 supra; T. FARER, supra note 105, at 49-52 (Ogaden unified grazing
area more integral to Somalia than Ethiopia in geographical and ecological sense).
118. See J. DRYSDALE, supra note 103, at 78-80 (dependency of Somali herdsmen on
Haud, Ogaden, and Reserved Area for pasturage and nomadic cycle).
119. See 1. LEvis, supra note 106, at I (arid Somaliland forms well-defined geographic
unit).
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concerns for the viability of the emerging unit; annexation to an exist-
ing state virtually assures continued existence. Ethiopia, on the other
hand, never maintained a continuous presence in the Ogaden before
the 1930S120 and only exercised effective administrative control over the
area after World War II.121 The Ogaden is not vitally integrated into
the Ethiopian state by economic, communication, or transportation
links.1 22 Ethiopia thus could not plead unviability if the Ogaden were
excised from its territory.12 3 Though Ethiopia's fixation on frontiers
as needed protection against invasion12 4 and its claim to oil deposits in
the Ogaden should not be trivialized, the right to secession should
prevail over historic fears, especially when accommodating solutions
can be devised.' 2 5
C. Violence
Finally, violence, on the part of both the Ethiopian government and
the Somali nomads, has been unceasing.120 This violence has not only
indicated that the Somalis are handled as a distinct, oppressed group,
but also has embroiled the superpowers in the conflict and ultimately
has undermined the independence of both Ethiopia and Somalia.12 7
120. See J. DRYSDALE, supra note 103, at 56 (Ogaden barely occupied by Ethiopian
authorities before Wal Wal incident in 1934); Spencer, supra note 116, at 24 (after
government asserted control over area in 1930s, settled Ethiopian farmers had scant in-
centive to leave cool, agricultural lands for nomadic life of Ogaden Somalis).
121. Britain, in agreements with Ethiopia in 1942 and 1944, recognized full Ethiopian
sovereignty over the Ogaden, Haud, and Reserved Area, but retained British administra-
tion over the Ogaden under a military convention until 1948, and in the Haud and
Reserved Area until the 1954 Agreement was concluded. See J. DRYSDALE, supra note 103,
at 60-66, 70-71, 75. For the text of these treaties, see SERVICES D'INFORMATION Du GouvERNE-
MENT SOMALI, supra note 114, at 204 app., 209 app.
122. See Spencer, supra note 116, at 26 (Ethiopians have had little inclination to visit
or live in Ogaden and have done almost nothing to improve it).
123. Cf. T. FARER, supra note 105, at 65 (independent Ethiopian state existed for 2,000
years without need for Somali-occupied territory).
124. See Spencer, supra note 116, at 23 (Ethiopia's wealth and strategic position have
made it focus of continual historical attacks triggering security fear that demands strong
frontiers and Red Sea outlet).
125. This issue perhaps could be resolved by an arrangement for joint development
and exploitation of these resources, or by compensating the Ethiopians for loss of prospec-
tive revenues. See T. FARER, supra note 105, at 147-48 (joint title); Spencer, supra note
116, at 26 (advocating compensation, which would also neutralize demonstration effect of
successful secession).
126. See J. DRYSDALE, supra note 103, at 84-85 (quoting London Times staff correspon-
dent writing in 1956: "Individual tribesmen have been brutally treated (it is not possible
to describe the intensely painful and humiliating torture) and Ethiopian police have at-
tacked the tribal women"); Washington Post, July 30, 1977, at A10, col. 1 (Ethiopia and
Somalia battle over disputed Ogaden region).
127. See Katz, Children's Revolution: A Bloodbath in Ethiopia, ROLLING STONE, Sept.
21, 1978, reprinted in I HORN OF AFR. 3, 9 (1978) (Ethiopians believe Soviets have "stolen"
their coffee crop for years to come in exchange for arms).
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The recurrent warfare indicates the intensity and commitment of
the Somali desire for unification and suggests that a solution short of
secession may be infeasible. 128 Moreover, a government based on the
will of the people could help to restore internal stability to the re-
gion.129 Soviet and American contrapuntal strategies might be defused
and those countries' presences reduced, thus permitting greater internal
self-determination for the states emerging on the Horn. 130
Thus, the Ogaden illuminates the fallacy of simply equating terri-
torial integrity with stability, and self-determination with disruptive
change; in this instance, adherence to territorial integrity has promoted
disorder whereas a right of secession could well occasion future
stability and peace.
128. Furthermore, the ethnic homogeneity of the Somalis obviates the need for judg-
ments as to how they would treat minority groups trapped within the new state, see S.
TOUVAL, supra note 108, at 11-13, and their egalitarian social structure and past conduct
provide some evidence that Somalia would act responsibly as a state. See I. LEwis, supra
note 106, at 10-17; S. TouvAL, supra note 58, at 84, 112.
129. The Ethiopians would also be able to redirect desperately needed resources to their
domestic problems; the Ogaden crisis, rather than galvanizing popular support for the
government, has tragically undermined social advancement and cohesion. See Katz, supra
note 127, at 8, 9.
130. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1979, at A14, col. 1 (West providing economic assistance
to Somalia yet refraining from arms shipments; Soviets might militarily restrain Ethiopia
and induce country to resolve dispute with Somalia). But cf. Spencer, supra note 116, at
26-30 (concluding that resolution of the Ogaden problem would contribute to internal
stability in the Horn, but would be meaningless in terms of precluding foreign inter-
vention since great power interests are focused more on control of Gulf of Aden, Red Sea,
and straits of Bab el Mandeb).
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